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INTRODUCTION
Markets require some sort of property rights, including transferabil-
ity. Without transferable property rights market relations cannot get off
the ground. Moreover, markets assume that these rights refer to some
resource, some thing that is the object of the market relationship. In this
sense property is, as some commentators recently have argued,' about
things. Saying that property is about things doesn't tell us very much,
though. It tells us nothing about the sorts of things that are the object of
property rights, and it gives no indication whether property rights are
uniform and fixed regardless of the sort of thing involved. Things are not
all of a piece; pencils are not Picassos. There is no good reason to think
that the law of property should treat all things alike. Modularity can take
us only so far. Property law does and should make distinctions regarding
the rights that owners have or don't have and the extent of those rights
depending upon the sorts of things they own.
This Article investigates distinctions that property law does draw or
should draw with respect to the right to destroy. That right has important
implications for the market because the consequence of full exercise of
the right, i.e., destruction of the thing, is complete and irrevocable re-
moval of an asset from future market transactions. Where the asset in-
* A. Robert Noll Professor of Law. This Article is a revised version of a chapter from
my forthcoming book, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING (Oxford University Press 2018). I
am deeply grateful to Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman for comments and suggestions on
this Article.
1 See Henry Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1691 (2012).
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volved is of a fungible sort, a pencil, for example, there is little cause for
concern about this loss. The losses about which we worry, however, are
those involving non-fungible items, pearls of great price.2 Such losses
include historic buildings and important works of art. Disputes involving
the right to destroy have ranged farther, though. Among the most conten-
tious and sensitive of these are disputes over the disposition of human
reproductive material. These controversies too have implications for the
market, as human sperm and eggs may be sold and bought under certain
conditions.
Despite its importance, the right to destroy is one of the least dis-
cussed twigs in the proverbial bundle of rights constituting ownership. A
recent article by Lior Strahilevitz analyzes the right in detail.3 Other than
his article, only an earlier article by Edward McCaffery, 4 and 1999 book
by the late Joseph Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt,5 have discussed
the right to destroy within the past several decades. McCaffery's essay
takes the position that most courts have adopted,6 rejecting the claim that
owners have the right to destroy that which they own. McCaffery regards
such a right as "an embarrassment in Anglo-American law."'7 This ap-
pears to be the conventional wisdom, with the recent edition of Black's
Law Dictionary excluding the right to destroy from the incidents of own-
ership included in its definition of ownership. 8 More recently, however,
Lior Strahilevitz has provided a powerful defense of the right to destroy.
Strahilevitz bases his argument substantially on expressive values impli-
cated in an owner's preference to destroy an object that he owns. 9 Sax's
book opposes a right to destroy with respect to works that have cultural
significance. 10
This Article analyzes the right to destroy from the perspective of the
human flourishing theory that I have been developing over the past sev-
eral years.'1 I will discuss four controversies in which the related ques-
tions whether owners have a right to destroy what they own and whether
2 Cf Matthew 13:45-46.
3 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005).
4 Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in NEW ESSAY IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 76 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
5 JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
CULTURAL TREASURES (1999).
6 See, e.g., J.C. & Assocs. v. D.C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, 778 A.2d 296 (D.C.
2001); Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Meksras Es-
tate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371 (Ct. Corn. PL. Phila. Cty. 1974).
7 McCaffery, supra note 4, at 81.
8 Ownership, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
9 Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 823.
10 SAX, supra note 5, at 17-18.
11 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Property's Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Val-
ues, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1257 (2014); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obligation Norm in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander, Social Obli-
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they have obligations to preserve their property. The settings that I will
examine, albeit briefly, are historic preservation, artists' destruction of
their own work, removal of public statues, and destruction of frozen
sperm. My aim is to show how the human flourishing theory provides an
illuminating framework for analyzing what is at stake in disputes over an
owner's asserted right to destroy something that he owns. Hopefully, this
framework will provide a more satisfying, analytically and morally,
means of resolving such disputes. To set the stage for these case studies,
I begin with a brief summary of Lior Strahilevitz's argument in support
of the right to destroy.
I. THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO DESTROY
As Professor Strahilevitz correctly observes, the right to destroy,
which in past years had been widely assumed to be among the features of
ownership, 12 today no longer enjoys much recognition. Under Roman
law the jus abutendi-the right to destroy-was important as marking
the outermost boundary of an owner's rights.13 If an owner could destroy
his own property, he could do most anything short of that extreme action
that he pleased. So also Blackstone, though hostile to wasteful destruc-
tion, 14 seemed to think that under the common law it was permissible for
a property owner to bum down his own house.15
Things have changed. Lior Strahilevitz states that "[b]ased on a
reading of recent judicial opinions, it appears that the conventional wis-
dom has turned against permitting a property owner to destroy valuable
property."'16 An illustrative case that he discusses is Eyerman v. Mercan-
tile Trust Co.17 In that case Louise Woodruff Johnston's will directed her
executor to have the testator's house destroyed, the land sold, and the
proceeds distributed to the residue of her estate. 18 The beneficiaries of
Johnston's will apparently had no objection, but the neighbors did. The
house was attractive, and shortly after Johnston's death, they sought to
gation Norm]; Gregory S. Alexander, Ownership and Obligation: The Human Flourishing
Theory of Property, 43 HONG KONG L.J. 451 (2013).
12 See Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 787-91. Strahilevitz points out that between the sixth
and seventh editions of Black's Law Dictionary, the editors of that well-known volume
dropped the right to destroy from their listing of the rights associated with ownership. Id. at
783.
13 See id. at 787.
14 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 220 (Thomas
A. Green ed., University of Chicago Press 1979) (1765-69).
15 See id. at 221-22.
16 Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 796.
17 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). Eyerman is also discussed in Adam J. Hirsch,
Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Approach, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 69-84 (1999).
18 Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 211.
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enjoin the estate for carrying out Johnston's will, arguing that razing the
house would hurt their own property values. 19
The court held that the will provision directing destruction of John-
ston's house was unenforceable on public policy grounds.20 The court
stated, "Destruction of the house harms the neighbors, detrimentally af-
fects the community, causes monetary loss in excess of $39,000.00 to the
estate, and is without benefit to the dead woman. '21 The court regarded
such destruction intolerable in a "well-ordered society. ' '22 It saw no justi-
fication for carrying out the testator's directions: "No reason, good or
bad, is suggested by the will or record for the eccentric condition.... To
allow an executor to exercise such power stemming from apparent whim
and caprice of the testatrix contravenes public policy." 23
Strahilevitz suggests that Eyerman contains within it "many of the
pertinent threads in the right-to-destroy debate."'24 It begins to open up,
he further suggests, the question of institutional competence that is the
core of the matter.25 Ordinarily, American property law leaves to the
property owner decisions about how best to use her property, but there
are two exceptions. The first is negative externalities: we remove the
owner's right to control when the uses she desires create negative exter-
nalities. Second, we do not permit owners who lack the capacity to make
rational choices to decide how her land should be used. There is a whiff
of the second factor in the Eyerman court's discussion of the testator's
will as "eccentric," but the court's main focus is on the first factor, nega-
tive externalities. This is true for most of the home destruction cases as
well. 26 Courts focus on considerations of neighborhood property value,
local tax base, and harm to estate beneficiaries, all of which weigh, in the
courts' view, against destruction. 27
Strahilevitz argues that protecting the right to destroy provides both
tangible and intangible benefits. The tangible benefits are that destruction
can enhance social welfare in several ways, such as protecting privacy,
creating open spaces, and encouraging innovation and creativity. 28 He
argues that historic preservation laws risk locking in place land uses that
are economically inefficient.29 He further argues that such laws may cre-
ate incentives that are, from a social welfare perspective, perverse: "Re-
19 Id.
20 Id. at 213.
21 Id. at 214.
22 Id. at 217.
23 Id. at 214.
24 Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 797.
25 Id.
26 See id. at 797-98.
27 See id.
28 Id. at 786.
29 Id. at 853.
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quiring the preservation of great buildings may ensure that some
beautiful and potentially influential designs never get built."'30 We will
consider arguments for the right to destroy that track efficiency and so-
cial welfare lines such as these a little later.
It is the intangible benefits that Strahilevitz identifies that are partic-
ularly original. He makes a case for the right to destroy that is based on
expressive values. 31 From the American colonists' act of dumping tea
into Boston Harbor to the Taliban's destruction of the Buddhas of
Bamiyan, for example, acts of destruction sometimes express deeply felt
values, and in some cases, such acts trigger First Amendment interests. 32
Moving from these obvious examples to examples of a more quotidian
stripe, such as Lady Churchill's desire to destroy the portrait painted of
her husband, Winston Churchill, 33 Strahilevitz contends "that expressive
motivations help explain otherwise puzzling destructive acts and situates
the right to destroy within First Amendment law." 34
Elaborating on this First Amendment connection, Strahilevitz distin-
guishes between two readings of the First Amendment: a "collectivist"
reading and an "individual-autonomy" reading. 35 A collectivist reading
permits regulation of destructive acts. 36 Strahilevitz observes that de-
stroying a unique piece of property is akin to heckling a speaker in the
sense that neither contributes to a healthy public discussion or points
toward the truth.37 The individual-autonomy view has difficulties justify-
ing restrictions on property-destructive acts that have expressive con-
tent.38 So, Strahilevitz notes, from this perspective, the destruction of the
Buddhas of Bamiyan is completely uncontroversial. 39 Strahilevitz finds
the individual-autonomy perspective more persuasive. He concludes that
"[r]ational people usually do not destroy valuable property intentionally.
So, where the government witnesses a rational person destroying her val-
uable property, it should presume that the destructive act furthers expres-
30 Id. at 820. Strahilevitz gives as an example Daniel Burnham's famous "Great White
City" designed and constructed for the 1893 Chicago World's Columbian Exposition. Id. Of
course, it was well-understood at the time that Burnham's model buildings, which were made
out of plaster of Paris, were never intended to be permanent. Id.
31 Id. at 823.
32 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (invalidating on First
Amendment grounds local ordinance barring display of a burning cross "which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion, or gender").
33 Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 826.
34 Id. at 823.
35 Id. at 827-30.
36 Id. at 827.
37 See id.
38 Id. at 829.
39 See id.
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sive objectives." '40 Strahilevitz acknowledges that this presumption is not
absolute and that expressive interests must be balanced against substan-
tial economic and social welfare interests, but from his point of view
deference to the owner's desire to destroy should be the starting point.41
Returning to destruction of historic buildings, as in cases like
Eyerman, Strahilevitz considers the case for the right to destroy to be
strong for both expressive and social welfare reasons. 42 The right is not
absolute, however, largely because of social welfare considerations. 43
We need to investigate these social welfare concerns in greater detail
because they dominate the debate over historic preservation. What I want
to suggest is that social welfare, although clearly relevant and important
to evaluating petitions to preserve buildings claimed to have significant
historic value, does not capture all of the relevant values at stake.
Strahilevitz, as we have seen, has pointed out another important value,
namely, the expressive content of assertions of the right to destroy some
artifact.44 But even that value does not exhaust what is really involved in
such disputes. Social welfare, expressive interests, and other values are
all aspects of human flourishing, the real foundation of such claims. The
following section discusses the connection between historic preservation
and human flourishing in further detail. This discussion will help set the
stage for our later discussion of other aspects of the right to destroy.
II. HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND HUMAN FLOURISHING
Historic preservation is a contentious topic, and it nicely frames the
right to destroy problem. Opponents of historic preservation sometimes
appeal directly to the need for what they perceive as creative destruction
and, with it, the owner's right to destroy. A notable example is Edward
Glaeser's 2011 book, Triumph of the City.45 Glaeser argues that dense
collections of creative people stimulate breakthrough innovations in vari-
ous endeavors, particularly in advanced economies based on information
technology.46 He expresses concern that such creative possibilities are
lost or minimized by land use regulations. 47 His basic argument is that
historic preservation protects too many buildings, gives too much power
40 Id. at 853.
41 Id. at 853-54.
42 See id. at 796-98, 822.
43 See id. at 822.
44 Id. at 823-25.
45 EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: How OuR GREATEST INVENTION MAKES
Us RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER (2011).
46 See id. at 47-49.
47 See id. at 260-64.
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to neighbors to prevent vertical development, the construction of which
could provide more affordable housing.48
In a co-authored paper, Glaeser refined his views following an em-
pirical study of the economic impact of New York City's historic preser-
vation districts. 49 The study found that construction activity fell in
historic districts following designation. 50 Moreover, properties just
outside the boundaries of such districts increased in value after designa-
tion.51 This apparently was due to the positive spillover effects of historic
designation. 52 The authors further found that designation raised property
values within historic districts, but only in the lower-valued boroughs
outside of Manhattan. 53 The broader effects of designation on property
values were increases occurring only in districts where the foregone op-
tion to redevelop was relatively low. 54 The impacts were also more posi-
tive in districts that were more aesthetically appealing. 55
These data importantly tell us that the effects of historic districting
in densely-populated urban areas such as New York City are, precisely as
the study's subtitle indicates, heterogeneous and that broad generaliza-
tion are impossible. This means that were we to adopt a welfarist per-
spective on historic preservation, we would not be warranted in making
any assertions about the welfare effects of historic districting in urban
areas except about specific housing markets given specific housing con-
ditions. This hesitancy also seems warranted by the conclusions of earlier
research and surveys of the economic effects of preservation. One survey
concludes, for example, that the field is not thoroughly studied, "nor is
there much agreement on answers to basic pragmatic and policy ques-
tions."'56 Welfarism, it seems, sheds some but not enough light on his-
toric preservation.
We are able to see why social welfare alone does not entirely illumi-
nate the values that inhere in demands to preserve certain buildings as
special in ways that affect the integrity and health of their culture and the
contrary assertions of those who view such preservation as inhibiting in-
novation and creativity within the same culture. The nature of these
48 Id.
49 Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould, & Michael Gedal, et al., Preserving History or Restricting
Development? The Heterogeneous Effects of Historic Districts on Local Housing Markets in
New York City, 92 J. URB. ECON. 16 (2016).
50 Id. at 17.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Randal Mason, Economics and Historic Preservation: A Guide and Review of the
Literature, BROOKINGS INST. 1 (Sept. 2005), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jses
sionid=1F5894BE99161D6F4FA02098ECB2D3C9?doi=10.1.1.506.784&rep=repl &type=pdf.
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claims is such that their animus extends beyond social welfare, at least if
we define that term in strictly economic or market terms. One obvious
good that proponents commonly associate with historic preservation is
historical memory. Buildings such as the Fraunces Tavern in lower Man-
hattan and Monticello are tangible reminders to members of our political
community of what our history has been and where. They express (draw-
ing here on Strahilevitz's expressive values theme) certain fundamental
values that underlay our political community. Peter Byrne tells us that
"[h]istoric districts.., offer a narrative connection with the past. ' 57 Such
buildings, he suggests, convey meaning about the past and "exemplify or
embody a historical narrative that people in the present value."' 58
Critics have challenged this historical justification for preservation
of historically significant structures and places. Again, Lior Strahilevitz
has taken the lead.59 He argues that the value of authentic history over
fake history is only marginal. 60 He points to the so-called "River of
Blood" monument located on Trump National Golf Club as an example
of fake history.61 The monument states that during the Civil War a battle
occurred on that spot, and that "[m]any great American soldiers, both of
the North and South, died and [on that] spot .... The casualties were so
great that the river would turn red and thus became known as 'The River
of Blood."'62 The problem with the monument is that its claim is com-
pletely bogus. The nearest battle during the war occurred some eleven
miles away, and the River of Blood story was contrived.63 Strahilevitz
uses this example to ask whether authentic history is superior to such
fake history in terms of educating the public, and his answer is "not by
much."' 64 As he states, "When society presents authentic historic facts to
present generations, especially in a manner tied to historical markers in
physical space, it often does so in a manner that is so selective, so simpli-
fied, or so beholden to contemporary preferences that its value over con-
trived history appears to be marginal. '65 The upshot, the cash value, if
you will, of this claim is that, for Strahilevitz, it is questionable whether,
57 J. Peter Byrne, Historic Preservation and Its Cultured Despisers: Reflections on the
Contemporary Role of Preservation Law in Urban Development, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 665,
678 (2012).
58 Id. at 679.
59 Lior Strahilevitz, Historic Preservation and Its Even Less Authentic Alternative
(Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 777, 2016), http://chicagounbound.u
chicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2459&context=law and-economics.
60 Id. at 1-2.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1-2.
65 Id. at 2.
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as is now generally accepted, there is a strong state interest to compel the
preservation of historic property. 66
There are several points to make about this line of questioning re-
garding the benefits of historic preservation. The first concerns the value
comparison between authentic and fake history. This is a false compari-
son, at best, unhelpful. Whether the preservation of authentic historic
structures is one matter that we can surely debate, but it adds little to the
discussion to draw a comparison between such history and contrived his-
tory and ask whether one is superior to the other and, if so, by how much.
There may be a false trade-off here because some examples of fake his-
tory may play a legitimate and valuable role in reminding a society of
important moments in its past. The fact that they do so, if indeed they do,
does not necessarily mean, however, that structures or places associated
with fake history merit preservation should the owner later wish to
change or destroy the site. Authenticity matters to historic preservation,
but it is hardly the only important criterion in the preservation calculus.
The more fundamental reason why the comparison is unhelpful is
that it really does not address the underlying objections that critics like
Strahilevitz have against historic preservation. One of those objections is
a claim of arbitrariness about the selection of what gets preserved. 67 The
arbitrariness of the historic preservation process results from several fac-
tors. One factor is the subjectivity of societal judgments that are the basis
of political choices between what gets preserved and what gets de-
stroyed.68 Strahilevitz states the argument this way: "To preservationists,
soaring and expensive structures that are used and beloved by elites
ought to be preserved, even if they become economically obsolete in
their present form. But modest structures in overwhelmingly minority
neighborhoods ought to be bulldozed in the name of progress. ' '69 Work-
ing here is a concern that the choices between what gets preserved and
what doesn't both reflect and deeply implicate issues of class, race, and
ethnicity. Historic preservation decisions are made through a political
process, and political choices are often skewed in favored of the wealthy
and privileged members of the community. Another factor contributing
to arbitrariness, closely related, is that what gets selected for preservation
reflects only contemporary preferences rather than timeless and objective
considerations. 70 Those preferences then bind later generations, the
members of which may have very different preferences. The irreducibly
subjective nature of the endeavor means that the value of preserved
66 Id.
67 Id. at 10.
68 Id. at 18.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 2.
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structures will inevitably vary both from group to group and from gener-
ation to generation. There is, in the view of such critics, simply no stabil-
ity in the matter.
Strahilevitz raises another concern that needs to be taken very seri-
ously. He worries about the exclusionary effects of historic preservation,
especially among minority communities.71 There is surely something to
this concern. Strahilevitz refers to a study by Professor Stephen Clowney
of Lexington, Kentucky. 72 Clowney's study shows how municipal and
powerful private participants in that city created monuments and public
parks that glorified historical white figures and ignored the role played
by prominent African-Americans. 73 It is the broader claims about the
causal relation between historic preservation and racial exclusion that are
questionable. Strahilevitz compares historic preservation with fake his-
tory projects such as The Villages, a retirement and nearly all-white resi-
dential community in Florida,74 and argues that historic preservation, no
less than the fake history perpetrated in places like The Villages, has
racially exclusionary effects: "Both historic preservation and the kind of
uniformly scripted narrative on display in The Villages aim for an aes-
thetic homogeneity that may engender demographic homogeneity by de-
sign. When the buildings all look alike the people living in those
buildings tend to look alike too."'75 Is this true? Is it the case that the
racial and ethnic composition of architecturally homogenous or similar
neighborhoods are or tend to be uniform? I have no data one way or the
other on this question, but one can surely think of anecdotal evidence to
the contrary. Queens, New York, for example, is one of the most racially
and ethnically diverse regions on Earth, but there are neighborhoods in
Queens, as there are throughout New York City, in which the residential
structures are highly homogenous. Yet, Strahilevitz and others are right
to be concerned about the gentrification effects that can and sometimes
do result from preservation, especially after designation of wholesale his-
toric zones. Gentrification has often had deeply troubling exclusionary
consequences, and preservation policymakers need to be highly sensitive
to the possibility of such effects.
More generally, it surely is the case that there are flaws in the pres-
ervation process. There is perhaps an excessive amount of preservation
of structures in our cities, although it is hard to know objectively what is
the optimal amount. And doubtless some preservation decisions are the
result of well-funded and well-organized groups acting out of self-inter-
71 Id. at 19.
72 Id. at 12.
73 See Stephen Clowney, Landscape Fairness: Removing Discrimination from the Built
Environment, 2013 UTAH L. REv. 1, 8, 10, 13-14 (2013).
74 See Strahilevitz, Historic Preservation, supra note 59, at 2-9.
75 Id. at 20.
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est rather than in the public interest. But I reject the notion that there is
simply no neutral or objective basis for judgments about historic or aes-
thetic choices. The New York City Landmark Preservation Commission
had ample objective grounds for landmarking Grand Central Terminal,
and it was, objectively speaking, a travesty that the original Penn Central
Station was torn down in the interest of a small and unrepresentative
group of power-brokers' opinions about progress.
We have still to consider historic preservation from the perspective
of human flourishing. More specifically, what obligations, if any, to pre-
serve historic or otherwise culturally significant structures do private
owners of such places owe to members of their communities, given that
the basis of such obligations is to contribute, in ways appropriate to the
owners, to the flourishing of such community members' lives and to their
own?
An initial, and very important, point to make in approaching these
questions is one to which I alluded in Chapter 2:76 that each of us owes
an obligation to our communities to support the institutions, associations,
and infrastructure that in turn support the special sort of culture in which
we live, the type of culture within which each person is able to experi-
ence life-defining freedom and to create his or her own personal iden-
tity.7 7 This is part of the obligation to support the social networks and
structures that enable us to develop those human capabilities that make
human flourishing possible. Some practical applications of this obliga-
tion are easy to identify. They are obligations that we usually associate
with citizenship; for example, payment of taxes used to build roads,
bridges, airports, and other common aspects of public infrastructure.
Other obligations are ones that we do directly tie with property owner-
ship. An obvious example is local property taxes, which pay for public
education.
At this point it is worth considering an objection that economists
commonly make: taxes are one thing; restrictions on private ownership
are another. Economists argue that as mechanisms for redistributing
wealth, taxes are much more efficient than private law rules. 78 For the
time being, I will remain agnostic on the merits of the objection itself,
i.e., the relative efficiency of taxation versus private law as a means of
effecting wealth redistribution, for wealth redistribution is not what is at
stake here. What is at stake is the scope of ownership-the parameters, if
you will, of the concept of private ownership itself. Private law recog-
nizes certain limits on the range of actions that owners are free to under-
76 See Alexander, Social Obligation Norm, supra note 11, at 758.
77 Id.
78 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994).
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take with respect to their assets. The law of nuisance is the obvious
example of this. These limits are not externally imposed by the state or
other actors. Rather, as I argued in Chapter 2, they are internal to the
very concept of ownership. What private law does is to recognize and
clarify these limits. It does so with greater or lesser precision, depending
upon a variety of factors, including the character of the owner's use, the
effects of the owner's use on his community and the character and extent
of those effects, and so on. The limitations to freedom to use, possess,
and transfer privately-owned assets that private law defines are not, at
their core, redistributive rules, although they may have distributive con-
sequences. They are, rather, boundary-defining norms, sculpting norms,
if you will, that is, norms that sculpt the contours of private ownership
itself. Courts tease these contours out of the concept of ownership itself
through a process of giving that concept the best interpretation they can
based on past understandings of ownership, both judicial and lay, and
their understandings of the value foundations of private ownership. This
is why it is wrong to suppose that when courts announce restrictions on
what an owner may do with her property, they engage in a process of
importing certain external norms which they then use as the basis for
imposing restrictions on how owners use their property.
Returning to our obligation to support the institutions, associations,
and infrastructure that in turn support the special sort of capability-nur-
turing culture in which we live, what does this mean for the owners of
historic or architecturally significant buildings? To begin with, let us as-
sume for the time being that we can agree that some privately-owned
building or structure is authentically historic or architecturally signifi-
cant. In real preservation disputes, there sometimes are legitimate ques-
tions about whether this is the case, so let us just put that matter aside for
the moment. Does the owner's obligation to support his community's
infrastructure entail an obligation to preserve that structure or building in
view of the claim that the reason for the obligation to support the com-
munity's infrastructure is just the fact that at least some elements of a
community's infrastructure are necessary to maintain the sort of capabil-
ity-nurturing culture in which the owner lives?
The answer to that question depends in substantial part on whether
we consider historic or architecturally significant buildings necessary to
preserve the kind of culture that I have been describing, i.e., one that
facilitates the development of the capabilities necessary for human flour-
ishing. Stated more directly, what are the purposes of historic preserva-
tion after all? In an especially valuable article, Carol Rose grouped the
public functions of historic preservation into three broad categories: in-
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spiration, aesthetics, and community building. 79 Of these, Rose persua-
sively argued, "the chief function ... is to strengthen local community
ties and community organization. o80 Rose refers to this function as com-
munity-building, but it is just as much a matter of community identity.
The claim is that certain physical structures can directly affect a commu-
nity's understanding of its own identity.
Identity here has both a cultural and a political dimension. The con-
nection between political identity and physical structures is easy to see if
we consider famous monuments such as the Lincoln Memorial in Wash-
ington, D.C., or buildings such as Independence Hall, in Philadelphia. It
is also evident, however, in private-owned structures such as Ebenezer
Baptist Church, in Atlanta. It is no accident that repeatedly throughout
history, repressive regimes have sought to erase the historical memories
of past political practices that nurtured the capabilities necessary for ro-
bust free citizenship.81 Not infrequently, part of the regime's effort at
erasure has involved destruction of architectural landmarks. Hitler
planned to transform Berlin, to pick only one extreme example, through
a massive project involving tearing down traditional buildings associated
with the Hohenzollern dynasty, which he despised, and erecting new
buildings and monuments designed by his favorite architect, Albert
Speer, all of which reflected Nazi ideology.82 He planned to rename this
newly Nazified city "Germania. '8 3 Rose points out that "the Parisian ar-
chitects of the French Revolution understood very well that the logic of
revolution meant the destruction of the cathedrals, those sirens of a
loathed ecclesiasticism."8 4 As Rose states, "[V]isual surroundings work a
political effect on our consciousness. '8 5
The connections among structure, capabilities, and culture are
strong as well. When we speak of building and maintaining a commu-
nity's identity, a large part of what we have in mind is its culture. In
Chapter 3, I discussed the various sorts of communities that are relevant
for purposes of considering the essential capabilities that property own-
ers require to lead fulfilling lives. Each of those various sorts of commu-
nities, despite their differences, have their distinctive cultures that form a
major part of their identities. From neighborhoods to national communi-
ties, we can and do glean distinctive cultural characteristics of and differ-
79 Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic
Preservation, 33 STAN. L. Rev. 473, 479-80 (1981).
80 Id. at 479.
81 Alexander, Social Obligation Norm, supra note 11, at 795.
82 VOLKER ULLRICH, HITLER: ASCENT 1889-1939, 601-07, 690 (2016).
83 See id.; see also ROBERT R. TAYLOR, THE WORD IN STONE: THE ROLE OF ARCHITEC-
TURE IN THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY (1974).
84 Rose, supra note 79, at 485.
85 Id. at 483.
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ences between various geographic communities. Physical structures are
very much a part of what constitutes these distinctive community cul-
tures. Buildings are part of what defines the sense and feel of a place,
whether we are talking about a street, a city, or a nation. For New
Yorkers, the Upper West Side of Manhattan "feels" different from
Queens. Paris "feels" different from Los Angeles. The architectures of
these places are very different from each other and so are their respective
cultures. Residents often come to identify with these places, and the ar-
chitecture enables such self-identification. Place, including its structures,
contributes to a person's sense of self. Even in a highly mobile society, it
means something to a person that she lives Tulsa, Oklahoma, rather than
Boston, and it means something to her that she lives in this neighborhood
rather than that. Architecture plays an important role in creating this
sense of meaning.
Architecture-structures-contributes to the development of our es-
sential capabilities in another way. In Chapter 1, I argued, following
Charles Taylor's lead,86 that we can develop as free and autonomous
individuals only within cultures of a certain kind. Those cultures include
communities of a certain kind, the very communities upon which we are
dependent for the development of our essential capabilities. Particular
places and particular buildings sometimes embody the life of such com-
munities and are essential to its continuing ability to thrive. Such build-
ings are part and parcel of the cultural life of these thriving liberal
communities such that the ability of these communities to enable capabil-
ities development quite literally requires the preservation of those build-
ings. What, for example, would Atlanta's Sweet Auburn neighborhood
be like if Ebenezer Baptist Church were destroyed and replaced by a
Hilton Garden Inn? It is hard to imagine that it would remain the same
rich, vibrant community. Historic preservation exists as a matter of a
community's knowledge and understanding about its own self-identity.
What should be said on the owner's behalf? What capability-related
considerations might one recognize in support of an owner's right to de-
stroy her privately-owned structure, however historically or architectur-
ally significant that structure may be? Expectations are often said to
loom large here. Private owners argue that it is unfair to deny their right
to destroy or to redesign a building that was not landmarked at the time
they purchased it. This is an important point, one that should be taken
seriously, including under a human flourishing theory. Expectations cer-
tainly figure in the evaluation of capabilities and flourishing. Security, a
capability without which an individual cannot hope to live as full and
86 See Charles Taylor, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE
HUMAN SCIENCES, 187, 207 (1985).
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rich a life as possible, depends to a considerable extent on the protection
that expectations receive at least to some extent.
The real questions, of course, are not whether expectations are rele-
vant, for they clearly are as a general matter, but when, under what cir-
cumstances, and how much. Private law does not protect every subjective
expectation that an individual has, nor should it. To pick one example,
imagine that I am the sole child of my widowed and very wealthy
mother. I may expect that upon her death I will inherit her estate, either
through her will or under intestate succession. Children often have such
expectations, but sometimes those expectations are dashed when the par-
ent dies with a valid will that leaves the entire estate to a charity. This is
perfectly legal, however disappointing and perhaps unfair to the child.
Our legal system confers a wide degree of freedom of testamentary dis-
position to parents, and as a matter of policy, the law does not protect the
subjective expectations of expectant heirs.
The law of takings is much concerned with protection of expecta-
tions of a certain level, and there is a rich literature on just what that level
should be. 87 The seminal case on protecting owner expectations under
the Fifth Amendment takings clause is, of course, the famous Penn Cen-
tral case. 88 In that case the New York City Landmark Commission had
previously designated Grand Central Terminal, which Penn Central then
owned, as a historical landmark because of the building's incomparable
nineteenth-century beaux-arts faqade. 89 Penn Central wanted to erect a
multi-story commercial structure atop Grand Central and submitted two
proposed plans to the Commission, both which it rejected.90 In the Com-
mission's view, both proposed structures would have done serious dam-
age to unique aspects of Grand Central.91 The owner then went to court,
claiming that the Commission's denial of its plans to develop the air-
space above Grand Central Terminal amounted to an unconstitutional
taking of property. 92
The Court upheld the Commission's actions. It announced a three-
prong test for determining when regulatory actions "go too far."
93
Whether a governmental action that formally is a regulation is de facto a
taking depends on (1) the character of the government action (was the
87 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethi-
cal Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Daniel R.
Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CoN-
TEMP. L. 3 (1987); Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of "Investment-Backed Expectations",
32 URB. LAW. 437 (2000).
88 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
89 Id. at 115.
90 Id. at 116-17.
91 Id. at 117-18.
92 Id. at 119.
93 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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government intrusion of the owner's property direct or indirect?); (2) the
extent to which the regulation interferes with what the Court called "dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations" 94; and (3) the resulting diminution
in the value of the owner's property. 95 The combined effect of these
three factors is a focus on the owner's expectations; specifically, whether
and to what extent the regulation has interfered with the owner's settled
and reasonable expectations. Takings law appears to protect owner ex-
pectations only to the extent that those expectations are both investment-
backed and reasonable. 96
What would this mean in the context of an owner's asserted right to
destroy a structure that is historically significant or architecturally
unique? In Penn Central itself, it meant that Penn Central's expectations
were not investment-backed because it had not invested any money in
the development project.97 The Court's subsequent use of this factor has
been somewhat unclear, but some considerations have emerged as highly
relevant to the calculus. One such consideration is whether the govern-
mental regulation affects one or many strands in the proverbial bundle of
rights that constitutes private ownership. If it adversely affects a reasona-
ble investment-backed expectation as to only one strand, no taking will
be found.98 That was precisely the case in Penn Central. The owner was
still able to earn a reasonable return on its investment. Moreover, the
designation of the Terminal as a historic landmark may have made it an
even bigger tourist draw, generating more revenue for Penn Central.
Given all of these circumstances, it is hard to see any essential capabili-
ties that were jeopardized by the agency's denial of the owner's asserted
right.
Take a very different case, however. Suppose a historic preservation
agency has preserved a privately-owned 19th century mansion that is
both historically and architecturally significant but in a state of great dis-
repair. The mansion has been vacant for a number of years, and the
owner had planned to demolish it in order to build a new apartment com-
plex on the same site. A local preservation agency, having determined
that the mansion is historically and architecturally significant, ruled it
must be preserved. The owner has established that the preservation cost
greatly exceeds the market value of the mansion and that he cannot af-
ford the cost of maintaining the mansion. The building has, literally, neg-
94 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
95 Id. at 124-25, 131.
96 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
97 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130.
98 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Robert
M. Washburn, "Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations" As a Factor in Defining Prop-
erty Interest, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 63, 68 (1996).
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ative value. 99 This case surely pushes a good thing too far. Historic
preservation cannot justify depriving an owner of the ability to develop
or maintain basic human capability needs, including economic security in
a literal sense. In my hypothetical, and the case on which it was based, 10 0
preservation at the owner's expense risked driving the owner into
bankruptcy.
An important point needs to be made here concerning the identity of
the owner. The reality is that in many preservation disputes the buildings
in question have corporate rather than individual ownership. Corporate
ownership makes the human flourishing calculus more complicated, but
it is does not render considerations of human flourishing irrelevant. Cor-
porations are constituted by and of individuals, and for many sharehold-
ers how well their lives go depend in no small part on the well-being of
the firms in which they are invested. It would be a great mistake to ig-
nore the capability considerations of firms simply because of their corpo-
rate identity.
The case that I posed in which preservation would seriously jeop-
ardize important capability interests of the owner illustrates the basic
point that here, as elsewhere, the owner's well-being and capability
needs, no less than those of members of his various communities,
count. 101 Joseph Sax struck a similar note in summary fashion: "If [pri-
vate] ownership alone is not self-evidently decisive [as he had argued it
should not be], neither is it obviously irrelevant."'1 2 The human flourish-
ing account is not one-sided. Far to the contrary, it takes into considera-
tion the capability needs of owners, as members of various communities,
as well as the needs of other community members. It does consider, how-
ever, that owners of historically significant buildings may have obliga-
99 These facts are based on a famous case from the German Federal Constitutional Court.
In the Rheinland-Palatine Monument Protection case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 2, 1999, 100 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsger-
ichts [BVerfGE] 226 (Ger.), the German Court held that the state either had to allow the owner
to destroy the mansion and develop the site or to expropriate it. The local monument protection
statute, which required the owner to maintain the building at his own expense in the public
interest, without taking into account the owner's interest was, under the circumstances, in
violation of the German constitutional commitment to property under the Basic Law. Id.
100 Id. A somewhat similar situation occurred in People ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey,
171 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960). The court granted an owner a demolition permit where
the costs of repairing and maintaining a historically significant building were high and the
owner would still have lost money even if the building had been renovated at the public's
expense. Id. at 247-48.
101 One of the strangest aspects of the Monument Protection Act, challenged in the deci-
sion of the German Constitutional Court, was that it specifically provided that the owner's
interests do not matter and that only the public interest was to be taken into account. As the
Constitutional Court recognized, such an approach to historic preservation simply cannot be
reconciled with a constitutional property regime that purports to protect private property rights.
102 See SAX, supra note 5, at 52.
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tions that extend beyond those of someone who owns one of the
hundreds of nearly identical 7-Elevens that are spread across the nation.
Collectively, these obligations constitute what Chief Justice Rehn-
quist in his dissenting opinion in Penn Central called "an affirmative
duty to preserve." 10 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist regarded this duty as some-
thing that was new and unprecedented, but it was nothing of the kind. To
be sure, affirmative obligations of ownership are not common, but they
do exist. Tenants may owe affirmative duties to landlords to avoid waste.
Cities require property owners to shovel sidewalks in front of their build-
ings and in some cases shovel abutting sidewalks as well.10 4 From this
perspective, the affirmative duty to preserve is not unprecedented.
The final point to be made here about historic preservation is that
the abstract duty to preserve is one matter, but the application of that
duty is something quite different. One suspects that much of the objec-
tion to historic preservation concerns the latter rather than the former.
There may be too much of a good thing here. What is historic or archi-
tecturally significant are contentious questions about which reasonable
differences can exist. Given that fact and given the fact that a decision to
landmark a building may result in substantial costs for an owner, it is
especially important that the process for making preservation decisions
be highly democratic and that the decision-makers be judicious when
deciding which structures to landmark. Not every old building is worth
preserving simply by dint of its age. The operative term is "significant,"
and the meaning of that term turns on the sorts of considerations that I
explored previously, including the relationship between the structure and
the community's self-identity, its cultural life, and its political memory.
What does the community's future flourishing require? To what extent
does the building in question contribute to the capabilities that are neces-
sary for the community to flourish? Would a decision to preserve the
building sacrifice any of the owner's essential capabilities such that his
own opportunity to lead an objectively well-lived life would be seriously
jeopardized? These are the sorts of questions that a serious investigation
into significance requires.
II. DESTRUCTION OF ART
Some of the most notorious controversies implicating the right to
destroy have involved art. One example is the Rockefeller family deci-
sion to destroy a mural that Diego Rivera had painted for them after
103 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 140-41, 146 (1978)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
104 See Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private Prop-
erty Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 2029, 2031-32 (2012).
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Rivera had refused to remove Lenin's image from the painting. 10 5 An-
other is the story of Lady Churchill's destruction of an unflattering por-
trait of her late husband, Sir Winston Churchill, which Parliament had
commissioned and Britain's most distinguished portraitist, Graham Suth-
erland, had painted. 10 6 Art owners may wish to destroy their art for any
number of reasons. The Rockefellers objected to the political message
which they attached to the Rivera mural, while Lady Churchill simply
thought the painting of Sir Winston downright ugly and unflattering. Are
there good reasons to restrict the rights of owners such as these or others
from destroying art which they own? What I wish to show here is how
the human flourishing account may help elucidate the stakes involved in
the decision whether to permit or restrict the art owner's right to destroy.
As cases like the Diego Rivera mural and the Churchill portrait il-
lustrate, destruction of art in various contexts raise different considera-
tions. Sax once observed that "the central history of art destruction is a
history of iconoclasm."'1 7 Iconoclasm was involved in both the Diego
Rivera and Churchill disputes, but with iconoclasts in different roles. In
the Diego Rivera mural matter, the iconoclast was Nelson Rockefeller,
the patron whose family commissioned the very work they wished to
destroy. Their motive was not caprice or whimsy. This was a clear exam-
ple of what Lior Strahilevitz calls expressive values'018 motivating de-
struction. The Rockefellers, lifelong Republicans, were concerned that
they might be associated with the political message implicit in Diego
Rivera's mural, complete with its nod to V.I. Lenin. By contrast, the
iconoclast Lady Churchill had no such political motive. Her objection
was purely personal and aesthetic. Here there was no risk of the patron
being tainted by some odious political message of the artist. The objec-
tion was just that Lady Churchill wanted to eliminate all traces of her late
husband's unflattering (in her view) portrait, rather like a person today
does with an unflattering selfie on his or her cell phone.
The Rockefellers were accused of being "cultural vandals,"'10 9 but
were they? Sax argued that they were only insofar as the community has
concluded that its interest in preserving the work of a great artist is more
important than its concern with promoting the patron's political
agenda. 110 Sax traced that conclusion back to the reaction against the
excesses of the French Revolution, when iconoclasts proposed destroy-
ing, as unrevolutionary, all Latin inscriptions on public monuments.' 11 In
105 See SAX, supra note 5, at 13-16.
106 See id. at 37-42.
107 Id. at 16.
108 See Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 824-30.
109 See SAX, supra note 5, at 17.
110 See id. at 17-18
''' Id.
638 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 27:619
response, abb6 Henri Gr6goire premised his argument that the monu-
ments of the ancient r6gime should not be destroyed on the ability to see
art of the work of genius over time. 112 Sax points out that this was a
thoroughly modem and secular idea, conceiving great works of art over
time "as a fundamental element of the community's human capital, and
as part of its collective entitlement."'1 13 Sax summarized his thesis this
way: "Art remains long after its (unwanted) message, or the owner's po-
litical ... sensibilities, have been relegated to history's attic. That is the
essence of the case against a patron's claimed entitlement to destroy. 114
However compelling Sax's thesis appears to be-and on its face, it
does seem compelling-there is more to it than that. Let us return to the
Churchill portrait. Is Sax's argument so compelling in that case? Unless
we are going to see political messages in every work of art, it is hard to
see how Sax's thesis has much relevance to Lady Churchill's reasons for
wishing to destroy her late husband's portrait. The existence of a political
or other message in which the public has a legitimate interest (aside from
sheer gossip) is one factor that qualifies the force of Sax's thesis. An-
other is time. Sax emphasized that the genius of the art may be revealed
through history rather than immediately. True enough, but that creates a
quandary. How are we to know which works by which artists will history
reveal as the works of genius? As it happens, I am an amateur painter.
Suppose I paint a darkly abstract painting that I name "Tweet of Trump."
I give this work to one of my colleagues as a birthday gift. My colleague,
not recognizing the painting as the work of genius it is, wishes to just
take it to the city garbage dump without my knowing. Should my col-
league be free to do so, or should he be prohibited from destroying the
painting because in the fullness of time the work may come to be seen as
a masterpiece? If he is not free to destroy the work, then in effect no
owner of any work of art is free to destroy it. Are there compelling rea-
sons for adopting such an extreme position?
Viewing the matter through the lens of human flourishing consider-
ations helps clarify what is at stake. Sax spoke of "the community's
human capital," but we can translate that into human capability terms.
Much of what was said earlier in connection with historic preservation
applies to art. I said earlier that each of us owes an obligation to our
communities to support the institutions, associations, and infrastructure
that in turn support the special sort of culture in which we live, the type
of culture within which each person is able to experience life-defining
freedom and to create his or her own personal identity. I also said that the
obligation to support this culture enables the development, both for
112 Id. at 18.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 20.
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members of our communities and for ourselves, of those human capabili-
ties that make human flourishing possible. The obligation to preserve
historically significant buildings was one instance of this broader obliga-
tion. The obligation not to destroy art is another. Great art contributes to
a rich and robust liberal cultural life, the very kind of cultural life that is
a necessary background condition for a well-lived life, one of self-defini-
tion and participation in a humane social environment.
But the obligation regarding art must be nuanced and carefully lim-
ited to circumstances where necessary capabilities are genuinely at stake.
Decisions about what those circumstances are will, of course, be contest-
able and require identifying relevant differences to discern whose capa-
bilities are at stake and to what extent. The Rockefeller/Rivera and
Churchill cases, for example, are different in respects that bear upon the
capabilities involved. The most apparent factual difference is the public-
ness of Diego Rivera's mural compared with a very private and personal
portrait of Sir Winston. That difference bears directly upon the relative
contributions of the two works to the cultural life of the two communities
most intimately affected. Rivera's mural was to be publicly displayed in
the RCA building, as it was then called, in Rockefeller Center in New
York City. Public art has become an important source enrichment of the
cultural fund of communities throughout the United States over the past
few decades. Works ranging from the Chicago Picasso to wall art have
added greatly to our public cultural endowment. Not only items of aes-
thetic appreciation, they are also icons of community self-identity and
even location.
Public art has also become, not surprisingly, the locus of great con-
tention. A situation that has become familiar in cities throughout the
country is that a city or a firm commissions an artist to provide an art-
work, commonly a sculpture, for a particular public space, but upon its
unveiling, the public reaction is loud and negative. The public demands
its removal. 115 Here the tables are turned from the Rockefeller/Rivera
controversy and from what they typically are when the right to destroy is
asserted. The public, not the artist or the patron, is the party demanding
destruction or removal (in the artist's view, relocation is destruction1 16).
Should a work of art be foisted on an unwilling public? A plausible argu-
ment can be made for an affirmative answer. There have been cases in
which the public's initial hostility has over time turned around and devel-
oped into acceptance and even affection for a work of public art. The
115 See generally ERIKA Doss, SPlrr POLES AND FLYING PIGS: PUBLIC ART AND CUL-
TURAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (1995).
116 See SAX, supra note 5, at 27.
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Chicago Picasso is only one example. 117 The change in public perception
can be understood in terms of Sax's point about the role of time in the
eventual perception of pieces of art as the works of genius. But time does
not always work this magic; sometimes the public continues to detest a
work of public art no matter how much time has passed since its first
appearance. Are there compelling capability-related reasons favoring the
artist's or the patron's right to compel the piece's indefinite public dis-
play? Other than an abstract autonomy right, no capabilities, at least none
that are essential to human flourishing, of the patron appear to be at stake
here. The artist perhaps has greater flourishing-related concerns that are
worthy of attention, notably her reputation. If the piece is removed in
response to a strongly negative public reaction, the artist may worry that
removal will seriously jeopardize her reputation as a successful artist
both within the artistic community and the broader community. That
seems to be a legitimate concern, but it misses the mark. Whether or not
the piece is removed, the damage to reputation has already occurred, so
that removal will have only marginal effect. The only possible response
that the artist may make is that if the public reaction does change over
time, i la the Chicago Picasso, the artist's reputation will be restored. So
the calculus of capabilities is fraught with uncertainty as to both the artist
and the public. Perhaps in the face of this uncertainty, which results from
the effect of time, one prudent solution might be to leave the work in
place for a set period of time at the end of which the relevant public body
might hold a public hearing to decide whether or not the piece should
remain or be removed. That would allow for a possible change of public
perception without permanently foisting a work of public art on an un-
willing public.1 18
What, then, about Lady Churchill's right to destroy the portrait of
her late husband? Is there a significant public stake involved? Stated dif-
ferently, does the community-here most immediately, the British pub-
lic-have any essential capabilities at stake in the preservation or
destruction of Sir Winston's portrait? Sax argued that the public had an
important interest at stake.'1 9 In his view, destruction diminishes the
public record of an important historical figure: "Posterity is denied an
117 See id. at 31-32. I am a native Chicagoan, and I remember well the public response
when the Picasso sculpture first appeared on the plaza in front of City Hall (now called Daley
Plaza). The overwhelming reaction was negative and derisive and strongly so. Today, Chi-
cagoans not only accept the piece but are proud of it. They consider it an important part of
what constitutes their city's identity.
118 This, in fact, was the solution that the city of Carlsbad, California, used to resolve a
controversy involving a large work of public art by New York artist Andrea Blum. See SAX,
supra note 5, at 29-30. The city kept Blum's sculpture in place for a period of seventy-eight
months at the end of which it held a public hearing. Id. Carlsbad voters voted overwhelmingly
in favor of complete removal, and that is just what the city did. Id.
119 See id. at 36-42.
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opportunity to see one version of a leading figure on the world stage as
he really was, or at least as he was seen by a major portrait painter."'120
He further analogized destruction of such a portrait to suppression of an
unfavorable biography. 12 1
Art, like writing, expresses ideas. The question is at what point have
those ideas become available to relevant public communities such that
the removal of those ideas or denial of their availability to the commu-
nity weakens the community's essential public culture. The legal defini-
tion of publication for copyright purposes is helpful here because it
illuminates what it means to make the expression of ideas available to
communities. In the context of copyright law, publication is defined as
the distribution of copies of a work (or offering to do so) to the public by
sale, lease, rental, or lending. Notably, a display of a work does not con-
stitute publication. Suppose I write an unfavorable biography of Trump,
offer it for publication to Farrar Strauss & Giroux, and they accept. How-
ever, before the book's appearance on the market, Trump's lawyers go to
court, seeking to suppress publication, arguing that it contains "fake
news." If Trump succeeds, serious damage has been inflicted upon the
national community's public culture, and the vital capability of its citi-
zens to decide for themselves whether what the book contains is credible
or fake, a capability that is a political manifestation of the more basic
capability of self-definition, has been seriously undermined. This is pre-
cisely why such efforts at suppression rarely, if ever, succeed.
Compare that with the case of the Churchill portrait. One can cer-
tainly imagine a situation involving a work of art that is comparable to
my Trump biography, but the Churchill portrait is not that case. The por-
traitist, Graham Sutherland, did not publish or offer to publish the por-
trait. Parliament commissioned Sutherland to paint it as a gift to
Churchill on his eightieth birthday. 122 There was a presentation cere-
mony at Westminster Hall, but in copyright terms that was not a publica-
tion, i.e., it did not constitute making the portrait as an expression of
ideas available to the public. An expression of ideas though it may have
been, nevertheless, it was never intended to be made available to the
public. True, it might have become available to the public years later
when both Sir Winston and Lady Churchill had died and ownership of
the portrait had passed to their successors. The Churchill heirs might
have decided to donate it to the National Portrait Gallery in London.
Perhaps not, though. They might have regarded it exactly as their ances-
tors had and wished to destroy it or at least to keep it hidden from the
public. If any of the Churchills destroy the painting, in what sense is
120 Id. at 35.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 37.
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there injury to the community's public culture? What, if any, specific
capability of members of his communities is undermined?
Sax argued that "much would be lost if we were deprived of such
works."123 The harm to the public that Sax sees is that it undermines the
public's "strong interest in knowing as much as possible about one who
played as large a role on the world stage as Churchill did." 124 The public
has, to be sure, a capability interest in having full access to all relevant
information about such persons as Churchill, but the operative word here
is relevant. The public did not have access to President Reagan following
his retirement when he was suffering from the ravages of Alzheimer's
disease, and properly so. It simply wasn't relevant to us. It was a strictly
private matter within the Reagan family; it wasn't any of our business.
By the same token, it is difficult to see why it was relevant to the British
public to see Sir Winston suffering from the ravages of age. That does
not seem to be the sort of information that bears upon the very legitimate
public interest in whatever aspects of his life remain connected with his
role upon the world stage.
On the other side, if Churchill's right to destroy is denied, will any
human capability essential to his living a full and well-lived life be un-
dermined? The capability that seems most immediately implicated is
self-definition, considered as a matter of personal autonomy. If the idea
of self-definition is that it is a capacity that a person needs to develop
into a fully free person, then presumably self-definition requires self-
awareness and self-honesty. A person who has fundamentally deluded
himself about the kind of person he is cannot be said to be free in any
rich sense of the term. He is a prisoner of his own delusions. A truly free
person is one who is aware of and acknowledges his weaknesses as well
as strengths. He may not like them, but he does not hide from them.
From this perspective, perhaps recognition of Churchill's right to destroy
frustrates rather than nurtures this important capability in the sense that
the portrait compels Sir Winston to face the reality of who and what he
now is as an eighty-year old man who is no longer in the prime of his
life. Faced with that reality, he may come to accept it and become more
truly free.
There is something to be said for that perspective. Still, it seems at
best paternalistic, at worst cruel. Why not let Sir Winston choose to think
of himself as he wishes? What great harm is done if he wishes to think of
himself, at an advanced age, as he once was? It is telling that he would
have preferred to have been painted in his robes as a Knight of the Gar-
ter, but the Parliamentary committee wanted a portrait of him as a mem-
123 Id. at 41.
124 Id.
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ber of the House of Commons as it had known him. 125 The art critic for
the New York Times wrote that the portraitist, Graham Sutherland, "is a
man who sets down exactly what he sees, and what he saw in this in-
stance was an indisputably great human being, the savior of his nation,
who had been struck down by illness and would never be the same
again."' 26 Even the portraitist himself was sympathetic to Churchill's re-
action, stating that "only those totally without physical vanity, educated
in painting, or with exceptionally good manners, can disguise their shock
or even revulsion when confronted for the first time with a reasonable
truthful painted image of themselves; there is a quilted atmosphere of
silence; as when it snows."'127
Recognition of the right to destroy a work of art in the Churchill
case would not necessary commit us to conceding that all other owners
of art must be granted the same right. The Churchill case is reasonably
distinguishable from other situations in which we might wish to conclude
that art owners have an obligation to preserve the art they own because
of human flourishing-related reasons. As I have already indicated, it is
distinguishable from cases like the Rockefeller/Rivera dispute where
what is involved is public art. The very publicness of the art means that
there are important capability-related concerns of members of the com-
munity that would be deprived of the benefits of the art were it de-
stroyed. It is also broadly distinguishable from the vast majority of cases
in which the owner of the work is not also its subject. Lest we worry that
recognizing Lady Churchill's right to bum her late husband's painting
will set a precedent for any eccentric owner of a Picasso, a Chagall, or a
Rubens is free to chop his painting into pieces, the Churchill case is a
highly unusual one in which the subject of the painting is the owner
himself and the painting was intended as a private gift to that subject.
In the more typical situation in which the right to destroy artwork is
at issue-where the owner has no relationship to the work other than
being the current owner-the default rule should be that jus abutendi is
not recognized. The community's capabilities at stake, notably the very
existence of the cultural life upon which it depends and in turn individual
members of the community depend for their own development as genu-
inely free and self-defining moral agents, fit with the owner's own capa-
bilities in a way that the lives of community members and the owners go
maximally well if the art is not destroyed, whatever the owner's ex-
pressed preference may be. Recall from the discussion in Chapter 1 that
human flourishing, unlike welfare, is an objective concept that does not
125 See id. at 40.
126 John Russell, Critic's Notebook: The Art of Finding a Met President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 1978, at C25.
127 THE TimEs, Jan. 15, 1978, at 4.
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depend strictly on subjective preferences. Even taking into account Lior
Strahilevitz's idea that where the owner of some work of art wishes to
destroy it there are expressive values at stake, there are other considera-
tions that we need to take seriously if we wish the owner to flourish in
any sense beyond his immediately expressed desire. People sometimes
act rashly and later regret their actions. People sometimes change their
preferences. Circumstances sometimes change in such a way that what
had seemed to be a rational action at one time no longer appears that
way. All of these and more are well-known pathologies in human ration-
ality. The human flourishing explanation of why the owner's well-being
is, objectively, maximized goes beyond the now-familiar critiques of the
rational actor, however. It rests on the observation that the owner, as a
member of the same community whose well-being requires preservation
of, say, a controversial photograph of a crucifix dipped in urine, 128 re-
quires development of the same essential capabilities as all other mem-
bers of his community. Those capabilities can only develop within the
kind of society in which there is such a thing as cultural, including artis-
tic, experimentation and controversy. This is precisely the reason behind
the First Amendment's protection of artistic expression from state sup-
pression. No individual, any more than the state, should have the power
to suppress the cultural innovation that is required for the kind of free
and liberal society that is an indispensable foundation for the develop-
ment of such essential human capabilities as self-definition and practical
reasoning. The individual owner of Serrano's photograph 2 9 who is
deeply offended for religious reasons is free to sell it, lease it, gift it, or
otherwise dispose of it short of destruction. He is also free to hide it from
the public, should he think that no one should view the photograph. The
right that he lacks is to destroy it, denying it from the community for all
time.
Of course, as a practical matter, regardless of the legal rule, private
owners may still destroy a work secretly. There is no feasible way to
prevent a determined owner from doing so. But what if an owner be-
queaths a work of art to a family member with instructions to destroy it.
Must or even may the family member, who is now the owner, comply
128 The reference is, of course, to the highly controversial 1989 photograph known as
"Piss Christ" by Andres Serrano. See Amanda Holpuch, Andres Serrano's controversial Piss
Christ goes on view in New York, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.theguardian
.com/artanddesign/2012/sep/28/andres-serrano-piss-christ-new-york. Imagine that a devout
Catholic owned the photograph and wished to destroy it, which he viewed as deeply offensive
to his Christian values. In such a case the owner's desire certainly is not irrational, and it is
unlikely that his preference would change over time. Expressive values do loom large here.
This is precisely the sort of case in which it is especially important to see the owner as a
member of the same broader community whose well-being depends upon preservation of im-
portant art.
129 See SAX, supra note 5, at 40.
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with those instructions? Or what if he does not bequeath it to anyone but
simply orders its destruction upon his death. Should his testamentary in-
structions be followed? This is an important question because most of the
litigated right to destroy cases occur in just this context. 130 As Lior
Strahilevitz correctly points out, "As a general matter, the law recoils at
the idea of allowing the dead hand to destroy property." 131 Here is how
two co-authors articulated the common justification for the law's restric-
tion on testamentary destruction: "[D]uring life a person personally suf-
fers the economic consequences, which is a deterrent to foolish decisions
ordering property destroyed.... Ordering property destroyed after death
imposes no economic consequences upon the testator, who is
dead .... ,"132 This argument is open to the response that it fails to taken
into account the testator's opportunity cost in ordering the destruction of
his property after death, i.e., the foregone opportunity to sell the right to
the asset upon his death, the value of which grows as he ages. 133
Whatever we think about these two positions, there still remains the
question of the community's capability needs. Everything that I said pre-
viously regarding the way in which art contributes to the kind of culture
that is necessary for humans to flourish applies here. Of course, at this
point the owner is no longer with us and no longer a member of his
former communities, so it is not his opportunity to flourish with which
we are concerned. But he was a member of communities, and his obliga-
tion to them continues to the extent that he owned at death an asset that
contributed significantly to that cultural life. Think of the obligation as
something like a debt that is accrued but unpaid at death. If I owed the
state accrued but unpaid taxes at my death, my death does not expunge
the obligation; my estate must pay the taxes after I die. By the same
token, the owner's obligation to his communities is one that persists be-
yond his death insofar as he is not free to destroy the asset that is the
subject of the obligation. He cannot simply cut off his communities from
the basis of their ability to flourish after he dies any more than he could
while he was alive.
There is a final scenario to consider-an artist who wishes to de-
stroy a work he considers unworthy of preservation. Sax gives the exam-
ple of Georges Rouault who, in the presence of a photographer, threw
over 300 of his own paintings into a furnace. 134 They were all unfinished
and unsigned, and he destroyed them in the fear that he would not have
the time required to finish them. Or to illustrate another possible reason
130 See Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 838.
131 Id.
132 JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 22-23
(3d ed. 1984).
133 See Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 840-41.
134 SAX, supra note 5, at 43.
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for artistic destruction, suppose Picasso intended to destroy some twenty
paintings he had done earlier in his career because he thought they were
no good and might harm his reputation if they were publicly viewed. If
one of Picasso's children sought to enjoin him from destroying the paint-
ings, who should prevail? Should artists be given the power to determine
who gets to see their work? Sax argued yes on the ground that an "artist
should be entitled to decide how the world will remember him or her."
' 135
Strahilevitz agrees with Sax, although for other reasons. He argues, first,
that the artist is in the best position to know which of his works is of
inferior quality and so should not form part of his legacy. He also argues
that if the artist is denied the right to destroy his works, we are compel-
ling him to speak when he would have preferred to remain silent. This,
Strahilevitz suggests, is particularly problematic in cases of works such
as "Piss Christ," which are likely to be highly controversial.
136
Strahilevitz's reasons seem quite compelling, but I want to augment
them with capability-related reasons why an artist should have the right
to destroy his own works. In the earlier discussion of the Churchill por-
trait, I suggested that in that case the capability most immediately impli-
cated was self-definition, considered as a matter of personal autonomy.
For similar reasons self-definition is also involved where an artist wishes
to control which of his works constitute his life's oeuvre. Our work and
its products do not define who we are as persons, but they form a major
part of the tableau of memory that we leave behind. Especially for artists,
our surviving works constitute expressions of ourselves, often very
deeply so, into indefinitely multiple futures. It is hardly uncommon for
people to take secrets to the grave with them. The desire to maintain such
postmortem secrets is not solely a matter of personal privacy, although it
is partly that. Motivated by reasons of vanity, a need to avoid hurting
others, or a consideration that something they did in the distant past no
longer conforms with the kind of person they later became, people have
many understandable reasons for not exposing every self-perceived wart
or blemish to future generations. Such blemishes may include some of
their unpublished or unfinished works. An artist may say to himself, with
complete honesty, "This [painting/sculpture/other work] is not me." Con-
trol over which of his works survive him is quite literally a matter of self-
definition, a capability that includes but is much more complex than pri-
vacy alone.
Closely related to self-definition, another capability involved in the
artist's wish to control which of his works survive him is self-expression.
Art is quite literally an artist's expression with the outside world, his
means of speaking to others. Painters not uncommonly reuse canvasses,
135 Id. at 200.
136 See Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 833-34.
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painting over old works as if saying "I don't mean to say that." The
canvas wasn't released, the word wasn't published. An artist may wish to
have one or more of his works destroyed for the same self-expressive
reasons: the work constitutes a statement that he ultimately wishes not to
express, for reasons of regret, changes in his personality, concern for the
feelings of others, and other reasons. Autonomy, if it is to have any ro-
bust meaning, must mean that a person can control what she expresses
and, equally important, what she does not express. Members of a per-
son's communities cannot compel a person to speak an unwanted (to that
person) statement and still claim to support her self-development as an
autonomous agent. That holds true after a person's death as well as dur-
ing her life. If she is to experience freedom during her life in a deeply
meaningful sense, she must feel secure that her control over her expres-
sions will survive her death.
IV. KNOCKING GENERAL LEE OFF His HIGH HORSE: REMOVAL
OF PUBLIC STATUES
It is not a great leap from disputes over destruction of public art
such as the Diego Rivera mural to the recent controversy concerning re-
moval of public statues commemorating personages from the Confeder-
acy such as Robert E. Lee and Nathan Bedford Forrest. 137 The issues in
the two situations are different, of course, but there is a thread that con-
nects them. The substance of that thread is the right to destroy, or at least
to remove from public display. The human flourishing theory may shed
some light on that debate as well as the debate over destruction of art.
Consider the case of the statue of General Robert E. Lee in Char-
lottesville, Virginia. The statue dates from 1917, when Paul Goodloe
McIntire commissioned it from artist Henry Shrady. Mclntire wanted a
public setting for the statue, so he bought a city block of land, demol-
ished existing structures on it, and created a formal landscaped square
that he named Lee Park. When Shrady died before completing work on
the statue, McIntire hired another artist to finish the job. Mclntire
donated the statue and the park to the city of Charlottesville. 138
Calls for removal of the Lee statue date at least to 2016, perhaps
even earlier. In that year, Charlottesville's vice-mayor publicly called on
the Charlottesville City Council to remove the statue and to rename the
park. 139 Following much discussion and debate, in February 2017, Char-
137 See Confederate Monuments Are Coming Down Across the United States: Here's a
List, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/16/us/confed-
erate-monuments-removed.html.
138 See Robert Edward Lee (sculpture), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert-
EdwardLee_(sculpture) (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).
139 Id.
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lottesville's five-member City Council voted three votes to two to re-
move the Lee statue and, unanimously, to rename Lee Park to
Emancipation Park. A number of plaintiffs, including the original do-
nor's descendants, filed suit to block removal of the Lee statue, and on
May 2, 2017, a lower court issued a temporary injunction barring re-
moval for six months pending the court's decision on the merits. 140 On
May 13, 2017, white supremacist Richard B. Spencer led a torch-lit rally
in Emancipation Park in protest of the Charlottesville town council's de-
cision to remove and sell the statue. On July 8, 2017, the Ku Klux Klan
held a rally in Charlottesville protesting the city's plan to remove the
statue. The Klansmen were met by counter-protesters, and police used
tear gas to disperse the crowd. Finally, on August 12, 2017, during the
Unite the Right rally, clashes broke out between supporters of the statue,
who marched under neo-Nazi flags and shouted slogans including "Jews
will not replace us," and counter protesters. During the rally, one
counter-protester was killed and several others injured in a car-ramming
attack. 141
Although the events surrounding the Lee statue in Charlottesville
have been the most violent to date, protests have erupted in other South-
ern cities that have announced plans to remove public statues of Confed-
erate Army figures, including Nathan Bedford Forrest, Confederate
general and leader of the Ku Klux Klan. 142 These disputes are not en-
tirely unlike the dispute between Diego Rivera and the Rockefeller fam-
ily over removal of Rivera's mural. There are differences, of course,
violence being one of them, but there are important structural similarities
that make them worth comparing.
Aside from violence, one key difference in the two situations is that
unlike the Rivera mural, the statues are publicly owned. Typically, as in
the case of the Lee statue in Charlottesville, they were privately donated
to a city for public display in a park. The difference is important because
it means that no private interests are involved, unless we take into ac-
count the interests of heirs or successors of the original donor. From a
legal perspective, whether their interests count depends upon the terms of
the original gift. If the donor imposed conditions or other restrictions, the
breach might terminate the gift and cause the statue to revert to the do-
nor's successors. Under those circumstances the successors arguably
have a legal interest worthy of recognition. Perhaps they have a moral
interest as well, but as I shall argue, that interest is slight when compared
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See Liliana Segura, Forrest the Butcher: Memphis Wants to Remove a Statue Honor-
ing First Grand Wizard of the KKK, THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 2, 2017), https://theintercept.coml
20 17/09/02/memphis-wants-to-remove-statue-honoring-kkk-grand-wizard-nathan-bedford-
forrest.
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with other interests at stake. At any rate, it is the moral question in which
I am interested, not the legal issue.
What capabilities are at stake in these statue disputes? The party
whose interests and capabilities are most obviously at stake is the com-
munity of Charlottesville. Actually, it is unhelpful to speak of "the party"
or "the community," especially in this context, for both terms are ambig-
uous and hide the real divisions of opinions that exist among residents of
the city of Charlottesville and, wider still, the surrounding county of Al-
bemarle. In discussing interests and capabilities at stake, one needs to be
sensitive to these differences. At the same time, however, it must be said
that among the legitimate interests and capabilities that are not at stake
are those of outside groups and individuals who came to Charlottesville
precisely for the purpose of expressing, many through violence,
messages of racial and religious hate, racial superiority and domination,
and separation. They were messages that were entirely anathema to the
animating principles of the United States and its fundamental legal docu-
ments. To be sure, a small minority of those who protested removal of
the Lee statue were there to express a different message, one less malig-
nant if still misinformed and misdirected.
Before examining the interests of these two sides of the protesters,
consider first what is at stake for the other residents of Charlottesville
and its environs, those who supported the decision to remove the statue.
As in the Rivera case, the publicness of the statue means that this com-
munity has capabilities very much at stake in the decision, specifically
maintaining and nurturing the existence of a certain cultural life upon
which the community depends. Such a culture is necessary for the indi-
vidual members of the community to develop as free and self-defining
moral agents. In the Lee statue case, those capabilities interests support
removal. This is not a case of historic preservation. The statue itself is
not especially old, nor is it architecturally significant. It is easily dupli-
cated without any sense of loss of authenticity. The real question is
whether its message is one that is worthy of sustained public dissemina-
tion. One message that it conveys is honoring the memory of Robert E.
Lee, General of the Army of Northern Virginia during the Civil War.
What shall we say about that memory as a public political memory? The
facts, not opinions, are these: Robert E. Lee was a slave owner.143 Is that
fact sufficient reason to disqualify publicly honoring his memory? Sup-
porters of the statue point out, correctly, that if it is, then there is much
other public memorabilia that needs to be removed. Statues and portraits
of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and other
wealthy Southern Founding Fathers all would have to be removed from
143 See Jacey Fortin, What Robert E. Lee Wrote to The Times About Slavery in 1858, N.Y.
TimEs (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/us/robert-e-lee-slaves.html.
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public display. Perhaps bridges, schools, colleges, and other institutions
and items of infrastructure will have to be renamed. Would removal of
General Lee's statue mandate all this change? The answer, I think, is
pretty clearly no. Although Washington, Jefferson, and others were
slaver owners, the important and distinguishing fact is that they fought to
create rather than to destroy the Republic. Stated bluntly, they were patri-
ots; Lee and others were traitors. No one would think it appropriate to
erect for public display a statue of Benedict Arnold. Why are Lee and
other Confederate generals any different?
More fundamentally, from a moral perspective, there is the fact that
Lee fought to defend a system of human enslavement. During the Char-
lottesville debates, some apologists for Lee defended him as "an honora-
ble man."'144 Whatever Lee's personal views on slavery may have
been, 145 the hard fact is that he fought-and fought fiercely-to preserve
that system. He owned slaves himself and never spoke publicly against
slavery.
I said earlier that members of the Charlottesville community require
a certain kind of cultural life for their well-being. That cultural life has a
broadly social and public aspect. Indeed, culture itself is inherently so-
cial. The very existence of Charlottesville as a thriving community, and
with community, the well-being of the individual residents, depends
upon a rich public expression of values that unite both them with each
other and with the broader political community of which they are a part.
The Lee statue is anathema to those values. There is simply no getting
around the fact that the Lee statue signifies events in our history that
legally, constitutionally, and morally do and should reject. Those events
begin with rupture of the Republic, but they extend to other events, in-
cluding the cruel facts of slavery, which the federal Republic repudiated
in 1863.146
That said, there is a Southern culture, and there is a Southern histor-
ical memory. Part of Charlottesville's community desires to keep the Lee
statue in place is to maintain and honor that culture and that memory.
Keeping a culture and the historical memory that is part of that culture
144 See, e.g., Editorial, About John Kelly's Racist History Lesson, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 2,
2017, at A26.
145 In a long letter expressing his views on slavery, Lee did describe slavery as a "moral
evil." In the same letter, however, Lee defended the system as necessary, even beneficial to
slaves. "The blacks are immeasurably better off here than in Africa, morally, socially, and
physically," Lee wrote. "The painful discipline they are undergoing is necessary for their in-
struction as a race, and, I hope, will prepare and lead them to better things." J.W. JONES, Tim
LIFE AND LETTERS OF ROBERT E. LEE 83 (1906). Further, he wrote, "I think it, however, a
greater evil to the white than to the colored race. And while my feelings are strongly interested
in behalf of the latter, my sympathies are stronger for the former." Id.
146 Slavery abolished in America, ISTORY, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/
slavery-abolished-in-america (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).
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alive and vibrant are important aspects of the capability-development
process, and that is just as true in the South as elsewhere. But there are
different ways of keeping a culture and its history alive, and not all of
them may be morally acceptable. Doubtless there are some Southerners
who would like to keep alive the memory of the Old South and the Con-
federacy by donning white robes and hoods and parading with torches.
Some of these might even wish to go farther in reenacting to unspeakable
acts in which their progenitors engaged a century ago. Such acts would
keep a historical memory of a culture alive, but obviously we cannot
permit just any acts to keep a historical memory alive. Some acts are
simply intolerable, even if not intended to harm anyone. In the case of
the Lee statue, what may have been an innocently intended attempt to
honor the South and preserve its memory was misguided and mis-
informed. Again, Lee was a traitor to the Republic and a defender of a
social and political system based on the enslavement of African captives
and their descendants. Public honor of his name or his memory is no
more morally acceptable than a public statue of Heinrich Himmler in
Berlin would be. Nowhere in Germany are there any traces of public
honor of the leaders of the Third Reich, and neither should there be of
any of the leaders of the Confederacy. The history of the Confederacy
must be preserved, of course, but that is an entirely different matter from
public honor of its leaders. There are appropriate places to preserve and
display the physical reminders of that history, such as museums, but pub-
lic parks, streets, and similar public spaces are not among them. The
distinction is between memory of a history and public honor.
V. DISPOSITION OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION MATERIAL
Perhaps the greatest controversy involving the right to destroy in
recent years has involved disposition of human procreative material-
frozen sperm, eggs, embryos, and preembryos. On the question whether
an individual has the right to destroy this material, the courts have been
strongly in agreement in affirming the right.
One context in which the question has appeared is divorce. A well-
known case involved a married couple who, following unsuccessful at-
tempts to conceive a child naturally, tried in vitro fertilization. Some of
the ova removed from the wife and fertilized by the husband's sperm
were implanted in the wife's uterus. The remaining fertilized embryos
were frozen cryogenically for possible subsequent implantation. These
efforts at conception failed, and the couple divorced. 147
The couple, the Davises, disagreed about the disposition of the re-
maining frozen embryos. Mary Sue wanted to donate them to a childless
147 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Tenn. 1992).
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couple, but Junior wanted them destroyed. 148 The trial court awarded the
embryos to Mary Sue. Viewing the embryos as human beings, the court
concluded that the decision must be based on the best interests of the
children, which in this case meant attempting to bring them to term. 149
The court of appeal reversed, concluding that Junior had a constitutional
right not to become a parent against his will.150 The Tennessee Supreme
Court, in Davis v. Davis, unanimously ruled in favor of Junior. 151 His
interest prevailed, the court reasoned, because "[o]rdinarily the party
wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other
party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by [other]
means." 152 This result and its reasoning are consistent with the decisional
law in other jurisdictions. 153
The question regarding whether there is a right to destroy human
reproduction material also occurs in the postmortem context. For exam-
ple, in one controversial case, Hecht v. Superior Court,154 a decedent,
William Kane, had deposited fifteen vials of his frozen sperm in a cry-
obank with instructions that upon his death the cryobank should either
continue to store the sperm or release it to Kane's executor upon the
executor's direction. At the same time, Kane executed a will bequeathing
"all right, title, and interest that he may have in any specimens of his
sperm stored with any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to
[Kane's girlfriend] Deborah Ellen Hecht."'155 Shortly thereafter, Kane
committed suicide, and Hecht claimed the frozen sperm. 156 His surviving
children from a prior marriage, both adults, argued that the probate court
should order the sperm destroyed, contending that the court should pre-
vent the birth of a child who would never know its father and prevent
further emotional stress on Kane's family members. 157 Their real con-
cern, perhaps, was the possibility of an additional heir who could claim a
portion of Kane's $1 million estate. The trial court ordered the frozen
sperm destroyed, but the California Court of Appeal vacated the order.158
It held, first, that Kane had an interest in the sperm that was "in the
nature of ownership."'1 9 It further held that the trial court could not prop-
148 Id. at 590.
149 Id. at 589.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 604.
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051
(Mass. 2000).
154 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 277.
157 Id. at 279.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 281.
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erly order that the frozen sperm be destroyed at the behest of Kane's
adult children.160 Quoting from the Davis opinion, the court stated,
"[N]o... person or entity has an interest sufficient to permit interference
with the gamete-providers' decision ... because no else bears the conse-
quences of these decisions in the way that the gamete-providers do."'161
In a variation on Hecht, a California appellate court has more re-
cently ruled that where a husband's sperm were held by a fertility medi-
cal center under a contract, to which the wife expressed assent, expressly
giving the husband sole decision-making authority over the sperm and
further directing the medical center to destroy the sperm samples in the
event of his death, the terms of the contract controlled. In Estate of
Kievernagel,162 the contract with the fertility center provided that the
sperm sample was Joseph's sole and separate property and that he re-
tained all authority to control its disposition. Following his accidental
death, his widow, Iris, sought to compel the fertility clinic to release the
sperm, and Joseph's surviving parents sought to block release. 163 The
probate court found that the question turned on the decedent's intent re-
garding use of his sperm, concluding that the contract evidenced the in-
tent of both Iris and Joseph that the sperm be discarded upon his
death. 164
On appeal, Iris argued that the court should not follow the decision
in Hecht because that decision ignored the fundamental right of a donee
spouse to procreate. Instead, Iris suggested, the court should apply the
approach of the Tennessee court in Davis, balancing the interest of the
deceased donor against that of the surviving spouse. 165 The California
court of appeal affirmed the lower court's decision. It first agreed with
the Hecht court that gametic material is a unique type of property and not
governed by the general laws governing transfer of personal property
upon death.166 The court also followed Hecht's lead in stating that the
person who provided the gametic material had at his death an interest "in
the nature of ownership" sufficient to give him decision-making author-
ity as to the use of the gametic material for reproduction. 167 Hence, it
concluded, "the disposition of the frozen sperm is governed by the intent
of the deceased donor."' 68 Davis's balancing approach did not apply here
because, unlike in Davis where the material in question was a preembryo
160 Id. at 291.
161 Id. at 289 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992)).
162 In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 313.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 316.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 313.
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rather than sperm, here there was only one gamete-provider-Joseph. 169
Hence, only he had decisional authority, and only his intent controlled. 170
Cases like Hecht and Kievernagel, in which frozen sperm alone
rather than pre-embryos are involved, seem relatively easier to resolve.
In such cases there is only one gamete-provider, and that person has es-
sential human capabilities at stake. The court in Kievernagel touched
upon these capabilities in saying:
In this case, there is only one gamete-provider. The ma-
terial at issue is Joseph's sperm, not a preembryo. Only
Joseph had "an interest, in the nature of ownership, to
the extent that he had decisionmaking authority as to the
use of his sperm for reproduction." (Hecht. . . .20
Cal.Rptr.2d 275.). The disposition of Joseph's frozen
sperm does not implicate Iris's right to procreative
autonomy. 171
Procreative autonomy is among the most intimate aspects of personal
autonomy. The decision whether or not to have a child and the related
decisions when to have a child, whether or not to parent the child, and
how to parent a child, are among the deeply personal decisions that an
individual makes over the entire course of a lifetime. They profoundly
affect how one's life goes and affect one's well-being in the most inti-
mate sort of way. Personal autonomy requires that an individual is capa-
ble of exercising self-direction through practical reasoning. This means
that he must be in a position that enables him to imagine future possible
life plans and to choose which among those possibilities will enable his
life to go maximally well, defined not solely in terms of subjective pref-
erence-satisfaction, but through realization of objective values including
love, friendship, personal dignity, and self-worth. Control over one's
procreative capacity is directly connected to the fulfillment of all of these
and other values that collectively constitute what it means objectively to
live a well-lived life.
To be sure, Joseph, as the sole gamete-provider, did not live in a
vacuum. Other people were affected by his decision regarding the dispo-
sition of is frozen sperm. The court in Kievernagel seemed wrong in
suggesting otherwise as it did in stating, "The disposition of Joseph's
frozen sperm does not implicate Iris's right to procreative autonomy." 172
The court took that view because there was no indication that Iris could
not have gotten pregnant with another man's sperm. 173 Still, it is not as
169 Id. at 317.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 318.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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though Iris was a completely disinterested party in the disposition of his
sperm. Joseph was Iris's husband, and it would be entirely plausible that
she wanted to have his child using his sperm. The disposition of Joseph's
sperm did affect her life, and we have to take that fact into account. What
needs to be said is not that Iris, having provided no gamete, has no inter-
est in the matter or relevant capabilities at stake, but instead that procrea-
tive autonomy and, more fundamentally, personal autonomy, play out
differently for Joseph and Iris. Autonomy and self-definition are at stake
for both Joseph and Iris, but they do not mean the same thing for the two
parties. For Joseph, this was a zero-sum situation: he either did or did not
control his future as a parent. If his expressed wishes were respected, he
would not be a parent, period. If those wishes were not respected, quite
possibly, even likely, he would have become a parent under circum-
stances where he would have been completely unable to enjoy any of the
benefits of parenthood. Such was not Iris's situation. Here the court was
right in observing that the destruction of Joseph's sperm did not necessa-
rily deprive her of the opportunity to experience parenthood, only
parenthood with Joseph's child. Seeing how personal autonomy and self-
direction have qualitatively different meanings for the two individuals in
this sense, it becomes clearer that the well-being of a person who is the
sole gamete-provider is so deeply and profoundly affected by the disposi-
tion of his sperm (or ova, as the case may be) that it would be an acute
mistake to deny him control over such disposition.
One might wish to challenge what I have just said on the basis of
the facts of Kievernagel. Pointing out that the contract that Joseph and
Iris signed that gave Joseph the authority to dispose of his sperm unilat-
erally only upon his death, one might insist that Joseph's well-being dur-
ing his life is not really affected by the disposition of his sperm after his
death. Contrary to what the court in Kievernagel said, Iris, not Joseph, is
the one whose autonomy is implicated by the decision how to dispose of
the sperm. There are several responses to this challenge. One is the obvi-
ous point that the facts might be otherwise in a different case. The agree-
ment with the cryobank might give the gamete-provider unilateral
authority over the disposition of the reproductive material during life as
well as after death, and for various reasons the gamete-provider might
change his mind and wish to withdraw and destroy the material during
his life. Second, and more directly, even taking the circumstances of
Kievernagel itself, Joseph's well-being is still deeply at stake in the ques-
tion whether to recognize his right to destroy the sperm after his death.
There is a matter of security here, not in a physical but a psychological
sense. Consequences would result from a decision not to destroy Jo-
seph's cryo-preserved sperm after his death but rather to permit his late
wife to use it to enable her own pregnancy. One concern that Joseph
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might have is that if Iris had a child using his sperm, a portion of his
estate would have to be set aside for that child, reducing the shares of his
living adult children. The law in this area is woefully unclear. In many
(most?) states, statutes do not address the question of the inheritance
rights of children conceived through assisted reproduction. The best law
in this general area is the Uniform Probate Code, enacted in less than half
the states. Section 2-120 creates, for inheritance purposes, a parent-child
relationship between the husband of the child's birth mother "if the hus-
band provided the sperm that the birth mother used during his lifetime for
assisted reproduction." 174 Subsection k goes on to provide that if an indi-
vidual is a parent of a child of assisted reproduction who is conceived
after that person's death, the child is treated as in gestation at the per-
son's death, and therefore entitled to inherit from his estate as a legal
heir, only under two circumstances: (1) if the child was "in utero not later
than 36 months after the individual's death", or (2) if the child was "born
not later than 45 months after the individual's death." 175 The basic point
of these provisions is to place a time limit on how long the sperm donor/
husband's estate is kept open to the possibility that additional biological
children may be added to his estate following his death.
Someone in Joseph's financial position, who had enough wealth to
pay for cryo-preservation, would likely have left a will. Such a will
might well have made a disposition to a class such as "my children" or
"my descendant," and the question would arise whether the after-born
child, conceived using Joseph's sperm, would be included in such a class
of beneficiaries. Once again, the law is unclear in most states. The Uni-
form Probate Code adopts the same approach as it does in cases of intes-
tate estates, i.e., a fixed period for closing the class. It provides that if a
child of assisted reproduction is conceived posthumously and the distri-
bution date is the deceased parent's death, the child "is treated as living
on the distribution date if the child lives 120 hours after birth and was in
utero not later than 36 months after the deceased parent's death or born
not later than 45 months after the deceased parent's death. '176 So, if Jo-
seph had a will bequeathing a sum of money outside to his "children,"
the distribution date would be his death, and a child later conceived with
his sperm would receive a portion of that sum only if that child survived
by five days and met either of the stated fixed time limits. If not, the
child would be excluded from the class gift. Of course, Joseph could
relieve his concern over this issue entirely by simply defining the class to
exclude any and all posthumously conceived children.
174 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(d) (amended 2010) (emphasis added).
175 Id. at § 2-120(k).
176 Id. § 2-705(g)(2).
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Aside from these estate planning concerns, Joseph may have deeper
anxieties. If Iris uses his sperm successfully to give birth to a child, Jo-
seph will become the biological father of a child whom he will never
know. The knowledge of that possibility might cause him considerable
anxiety, even emotional pain, over the potential loss of knowing, bond-
ing with, and raising his own child. Not everyone feels this way, of
course; some are very happy at the thought of leaving behind their bio-
logical children even though they may never know the child. But others
find such a thought quite painful and would prefer to be relieved of any
such possibility. 177 That may have been part or even all of the motivation
behind the term that Joseph chose in his contract in Kievernagel provid-
ing that upon his death the sperm was to be discarded rather than donated
to his wife.178 The assumption that his expressly stated contractual term
would be honored and enforced may have been the requisite source of
emotional security and support that he needed to commit himself to pre-
serve his sperm in the first place. Given all of these possible conse-
quences, it seems quite clear that Joseph's well-being was not only very
much at stake in the question whether to recognize his right to destroy
the sperm after his death, but primarily so.
The harder case is Davis v. Davis, where both partners rather than
just one were the gamete-providers. Recall that in that case, the two par-
ties were now divorced and disagreed about the proper disposition of
preserved pre-embryos that had been created with Junior's sperm and
Mary Sue's ova. He wanted them discarded, but she wanted to donate
them to a childless couple. Unlike the couple in Kievernagel, the parties
did not sign an agreement at the time of in vitro fertilization.
Both parties have real and substantial interests that involve their es-
sential capabilities. Everything that I said earlier regarding the capabili-
ties at stake for Joseph in Kievernagel applies equally as to Junior.
Privacy, personal security in multiple senses, and self-definition of him-
self as a person and as a parent are all very much involved in his ability
to control the disposition of his own sperm. His situation did differ from
Joseph's to the extent that his ex-wife, Mary Sue, did not plan to use his
sperm to become pregnant herself. But there still remained the open
question whether he was to father a child whom he might never know.
There are good reasons why the law recognizes a privacy right to avoid
procreating. Mary Sue, as the other gamete-donor, also had a personal
interest, although perhaps not as strong as if her plan had been to use her
177 The court in Davis discussed this problem in some detail. See Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). The sperm donor in that case had experienced substantial
emotional pain earlier in his life as a result of separation from his birth mother at an early age
and for that reason he adamantly opposed permitting his sperm to be used to conceive a child
with whom he would have no contact. Id.
178 In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
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ex-husband's sperm to become pregnant herself. The court in Davis sug-
gested that the case would have been closer "if Mary Sue Davis were
seeking to use the preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve
parenthood by any other reasonable means."1 79
Lior Strahilevitz properly points to what he calls "the libertarian
tone" of these opinions. 180 Nowhere do the courts discuss any concerns
other than those of the immediate parties-the gamete-donors and their
spouses. Strahilevitz suggests that in a case like Davis, "society had a
powerful interest in permitting the embryos' transfer to a couple that was
otherwise unable to conceive." 18' Nevertheless, in these cases the appel-
late courts make no mention of any interest that the community might
have. 182 This is both odd and unfortunate, for members of communities
do certainly have legitimate interests in the disposition of the sperm and
the pre-embryos. The most obvious interest is enabling couples who are
otherwise unable to conceive children of their own to have children. This
was the interest that Mary Sue Davis, as a kind of surrogate for childless
couples, raised, but the court did not consider the interest of those
couples or the broader public's possible interest in facilitating concep-
tion. Important capabilities are involved in those interests. For many
couples, the ability to have children directly affects their self-definition
and self-identification. To be sure, adoption is an alternative, but some
couples consider that their fulfillment, both individually and as a couple,
can only come through carrying a child to birth. More broadly, society
has its own capabilities at stake. A society's procreative policies immedi-
ately affect its very self-preservation. To take an extreme example, one
thinks of the one-child policy instituted by the state in the People's Re-
public of China, beginning in 1979 and gradually phased out beginning
in 2015.183 Whatever one's opinion regarding the wisdom or morality of
that policy, it was a measure undertaken in the interest of what the gov-
ernment judged China's self-preservation required.
The Chinese one-child policy is illuminating for a different reason,
however. It brings into focus the question whether we really want to
prioritize society's interests over that of the individual gamete-donor on a
matter so deeply personal as procreation and parenthood. The question is
not whether society's interests should be taken into account. Society's
interests and its capabilities do need to be taken into account, for they
certainly affect human flourishing. The real question is what is the best
179 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
180 See Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 837.
181 Id. at 836.
182 Id. at 837.
183 Vasudevan Sridharan, China fonnally abolishes decades-old one child policy, IB-
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/china-formally-abolishes-decades-old-one-
child-policy- 1535006.
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fit between those interests and the interests of the gamete-donor(s) who
is immediately involved. This is not a matter of weighing the interests
against each other because all of the affected interests involve values that
resist weighting. This is why I have framed the question in terms of ask-
ing what is the best fit. This is closely related to what Charles Taylor
calls "complementarity."' 18 4 We ask how the interests and the affected
capabilities of society and the gamete-donor interact with each other such
that we might be able to discern an understanding of what human flour-
ishing means in this situation and what it requires. Our perception of
society's capability needs might be, for example, that the current birth
rate optimizes its resources and, more fundamentally, that adoption is
now a means to achieving parenthood that is not only available to
couples who are unable to conceive of children themselves, but is widely
practiced and has become a mainstream social practice. Some couples
may not consider it a perfect substitute for having their own biological
children, but that choice is not one that is available here. The alternative
to adoption in this situation is conceiving a child with the use of another
man's sperm, and along a spectrum whose poles are, on the one hand,
biological birth using procreative material from both partners, and, on the
other, adoption (in which neither parent contributes genetic material),
that alternative immediately moves us some distance away from the
couple's preferred pole toward the opposite pole-adoption. The point is
that the decision to recognize the gamete-donor's right to control the dis-
position of his procreative material does not entail a substantial sacrifice
in the what needs and what capabilities of couples who potentially would
use the material for conception-or to society as a whole-can realisti-
cally be met in this situation.
Unlike couples who are potential users of the genetic material, for
the gamete-holder this is a zero-sum situation concerning his interests,
concerns, and capabilities. Those interests and capabilities either will or
will not be realized in full depending on whether we recognize his right
to control the disposition of his sperm. And, as I have already discussed,
those interests are essential to his ability to experience a life well-lived.
His emotional and psychological well-being would be directly and sub-
stantially jeopardized were he not in control of his status as a parent. This
is precisely why the law regards procreative autonomy a matter meriting
particularly strong legal protection. It lies at the very core of what it
means to be able to define oneself, one's identity, and one's own life
plan.
Viewing the interests and the affected capabilities of society and the
gamete-donor this way, it becomes possible to discern what human flour-
184 See Taylor, supra note 86.
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ishing means in this situation and what it requires. The relationship be-
tween the interests and capabilities of society and the gamete-donor here
is less one of conflict than one in which from an objective viewpoint,
deference is due. Taking into account how deeply a person's capability to
define the very meaning of himself, his identity and the course of his life
depends on control of his procreative ability and taking into account the
asymmetrical positions of the two sides with respect to alternatives avail-
able to them, human flourishing objectively requires that one side's inter-
ests defer to the other. The fit between the interests of society and other
couples who are potential users of the procreative materials and the inter-
ests of the gamete-donor is actually complementary rather than directly
in conflict.
CONCLUSION
Courts tend to frame right-to-destroy disputes in terms of a conflict
between respecting individual autonomy and avoiding social waste. That
framing unduly obscures what is involved in these cases. Autonomy is a
rich value that requires discerned investigation, and social waste masks
the existence of community capabilities of legitimate concern. A human
flourishing perspective illuminates these multiple values and capabilities.
Conflicts involving the right to destroy resist neat categorical solutions,
but that does not mean that they cannot be resolved rationally or even
with a relatively high degree of predictability, as I have tried to show in
this Article.
